Is ‘piracy’ theft? A response to Mike LaBossiere

by Michael Billy on March 5, 2011

Over at Talking Philosophy, Mike LaBossiere asks the question “Is piracy theft?” My immediate response is no and my reasoning is very similar to that of Markus Persson, who LaBossiere mentions in his post:

Normally one would expect that a commercial computer game developer would be opposed to the piracy of software. However, Minecraft creator Markus Persson’s stated that “piracy is not theft” at the Game Developers Conference.

Persson’s argument is exactly the sort that I have seen in student papers for years: “Piracy is not theft. If you steal a car, the original is lost. If you copy a game, there are simply more of them in the world.”

This is, of course, a compelling argument. It is also why I dislike using the term ‘piracy’ in relation to copying or sharing music and software. Piracy, after all, connotates Somali renegades raiding ships and taking hostages. In these instances (as with all cases of actual theft) a person is denied use of their legitimately acquired property. When software and music are ‘pirated’, however, the original owner still has his or her property.

But LaBossiere poses an objection:

If this is pushed, it might be taken as applying to identity piracy and pirating credit card numbers. After all, if someone pirates your identity or your credit card number, you still possess both. The pirate is merely using what they have pirated, just as the pirate merely uses the pirated software. As such, copying your identity or your credit card number would be piracy rather than theft.

On the face of it, this does seem like an absurd result. If it does really follow from Persson’s principle, then it would show that his principle is flawed. Unless, of course, this result does not follow or it does an one bites the bullet and accepts the results.

I disagree. Or rather, I do not believe that this conclusion necessarily follows. Even if it does, there is a flaw. Let me explain.

‘Pirating’ a credit card number – taken in this context, similar to pirating software, as meaning merely copying the digital information – is not necessarily wrong. As LaBossiere says, the person is still in possession of his credit card. But this argument falls apart once that information is actually used.

Theft occurs if the person who copied the information uses the credit card number to make purchases. In effect, they are stealing available credit from the card holder, who now no longer possesses that credit. More importantly, perhaps, they are stealing the credit card owners future labor because he will have to pay off the debt that the theft created.

The same argument could be made for identity theft. After all, I know other people’s social security numbers; but, that knowledge is not identity theft unless I use that information for nefarious purposes like obtaining credit in one of those person’s names.

The argument for those who believe piracy is theft then becomes something like, “Well, the pirates are stealing something from the original software publisher. They are stealing sells.”

“Stealing sells,” though, is not always unjust. Take, for instance, a case where software publisher A offers a comparable product at a cheaper price than software publisher B. It could be argued that software publisher A is stealing sells from software publisher B. Yet, it would be difficult to argue that this is unjust. Therefore, it seems that there are at least some cases where “stealing sells” is just and some cases where it is unjust.

For an unjust case, LaBossiere posits a scenario where someone maliciously spreads rumors that a vegetarian company is putting goat testicles in their food. This could lead to lost sells and it certainly is unjust. However, it is unjust because the vegetarian company was slandered. This is not entirely analogous to pirating software, but it does show that there are some ways that losing sells can be seen as unjust.

LaBossiere then claims that piracy is a case where the lost sales would be unjust:

Piracy certainly seems to be a situation in which revenue is lost via means that are unjust. After all, if I buy Starcraft II rather than a competitor because Strarcraft II is a better game, then that is hardly unjust. However, if I do not buy the competitor because I have pirated it, that seems to be a rather different sort of scenario. Blizzard has the right to compete, but I can hardly claim that I have a right to copy software.

He is right, of course, that pirating software is “a rather different sort of scenario.” This is obvious. But it does not logically follow that pirating software is also unjust.

To illustrate the supposed unjustness he attempts an analogy:

That this is so can be seen in the following analogy involving a test. One way to do well on a test is to “pay” an honest price by going to class and studying. Another way is to simply copy the answers off the person who actually attended class and studies. Obviously, the person copying is not stealing answers in the sense of removing them from the original test, but they have no right to those answers and it would be quite right to prevent them from doing so and punishing them. It would also make sense to regard them as stealing-after all, they are taking what they have not earned. Likewise for pirates.

There is a problem with this analogy. For me, at least, cheating on a test is not wrong because the cheater is “stealing” answers. The underlying moral principle here is, instead, fraud. The student is indeed defrauding the professor by inherently asserting that he arrived at the answers on his own. Moreover, if that student manages to obtain a degree, he is defrauding his future employer who expects that he obtained the degree by following the universities code of conduct, which presumable would not allow for cheating.

In the case of copying software there is no fraud committed. That is unless the pirate is distributing the software in a manner that suggests that the original publisher approved. For instance, if the Starcraft II pirate posted his ‘pirated’ copy of the game online with a message saying, “this is an officially licensed copy of the game approved by Blizzard,” then it would clearly be a case of fraud. Or, if the pirate distributed the game with packaging and a CD label that suggests that it is an official version of the game it would also be fraudulent, unless the consumer were explicitly told that it were an unauthorized version. When a game is downloaded on a torrent site, however, there is no expectation that it is an official version and therefore there is no fraud.

For more, check out the fantastic book Against Intellectual Monopoly

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  • Prof Mcnoodle
  • Felipe Morales

    You say:

    “For me, at least, cheating on a test is not wrong because the cheater is “stealing” answers. The underlying moral principle here is, instead, fraud. The student is indeed defrauding the professor by inherently asserting that he arrived at the answers on his own. Moreover, if that student manages to obtain a degree, he is defrauding his future employer who expects that he obtained the degree by following the universities code of conduct, which presumable would not allow for cheating.”

    So if the student would say the teacher upfront that he didn’t arrive at the answers on his own, no moral principle would be violated? And if the university’s code of conduct would have no stated rules for cheating, he wouldn’t be doing anything wrong?

    It seems to me that in the case of cheating, it is wrong because it can undermine the conditions upon the “test” institution is based. If the whole point of testing a person is to know if the person can get to the answers on his own, a cheating person would be doing a wrong regardless he is committing fraud. The person wouldn’t be playing “for the rules”, which, it can be assumed, the person has accepted. This is, I think, the whole basis for the idea of crime. The point being that given certain conventions certain actions are right and some others wrong *in an internal sense*.

    Likewise, in the case of piracy, if there is the convention of “selling a good” and it applies to a certain good, it implicitly binds anyone wanting the good to go by the rules of the convention in order to have it. A pirate would be making the goods available to himself by passing over the conventions.

    Of course, the question is then whether *the conventions* are justified or not (right or wrong *in an external sense*), which is a harder one to tackle.

    Just my two cents.

    • http://twitter.com/MikeBilly Mike Billy

      “So if the student would say the teacher upfront that he didn’t arrive at the answers on his own, no moral principle would be violated? And if the university’s code of conduct would have no stated rules for cheating, he wouldn’t be doing anything wrong?”

      Honestly, if the student is not being deceptive towards the professor then I don’t see anything wrong. Though there might be something morally wrong with the professor allowing it to happen, even if the school has no stated policy against cheating.

      “Of course, the question is then whether *the conventions* are justified or not (right or wrong *in an external sense*), which is a harder one to tackle.”

      This is the question and I come down on the side of no.

      • Felipe Morales

        Certainly. It simply happens that your position strikes me as odd, and your stated argument doesn’t seem decisive about your conclusion about the external issue.

        If there’s nothing wrong if the student cheats and isn’t deceptive about it with the professor, how could it be wrong that the teacher allowed it to happen? There seems to be an asymmetry in your description of the relative standpoints of the student and the teacher. It’s like you’re saying that the student seems to never go wrong, but the teacher *can*, if he allows cheating to happen. How can that be reconciled with your opinion that the “test” convention is wrong in an external sense?

        It seems to me that if the student isn’t wrong by cheating, then the teacher isn’t wrong in allowing it to happen. Why would he disallow with any justification something which isn’t wrong?

        • http://blog.mikebilly.com Mike Billy

          Touche.

          I shouldn’t have posted so hastily, but I think my logic was something like this: The student has voluntarily entered into a situation were, to some extent, the professor is an authority figure, at least in regards to the goings-on of the classroom. Therefore, it’s hard to blame a student for cheating if he told the professor he was going to do so and the professor allowed it. So (slight logical jump here) the professor is responsible. He is in the wrong.

          That, however, doesn’t mean the student isn’t also in the wrong. Again, though, I find him less to blame when the professor allowed him to do it versus a situation were cheating were explicitly banned. This is especially true if the university doesn’t have a stated policy against cheating either.

          So perhaps the conventions of the classroom are what matters. Then again, I wonder what kind of environment that classroom is. Is everyone allowed to cheat, or only the one kid? If everyone (and the university is ok with it), then I’m not sure there is anything morally wrong with the situation. However, I would wonder why anyone would want to be in that classroom. If, on the other hand, the professor is giving one student an advantage over the others then there certainly is a problem.

          But that’s exactly what patents and copyright do. They give a monopoly advantage. The cheater couldn’t get the answers, but neither could anyone else who came to those answers on their own, except the first person.

          • Felipe Morales

            Yes, I agree with you on that.

            The case of cheating being allowed (and I was thinking it would be allowed for anyone) is a thought experiment of sorts. I was wondering what would hold in such a situation, and I thought that maybe the difference between it and the everyday situations we’re actually faced to would show how (in the real cases) there are obligations which would make the cheating student in the wrong.

            All of this is very interesting. I wonder now how it can be applied to the original discussion on the piracy case. It seems to me that in the piracy case the problem isn’t so much the copyright issue but the paying vs. not paying one.

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  • Jonathan Livengood

    This was a really enjoyable post. Thanks for writing it. I have a question. Do you think it is morally permissible for a music or film pirate to sell copies that are explicitly labeled as unlicensed? For example, suppose I sneak in to a pre-screening of a new blockbuster film and record it. I then make a dozen DVD copies and go stand on the street and say, “Pirated DVDs here, only five dollars!” If I sell those DVDs successfully, have I done something wrong? If I have, what do you think I have done wrong?

    • Xovicus

      That is still fraud, because the company who owns the licensing to that product has been defrauded.

      Your argument is essentially the same as buying a movie from the store at $23 (the movie carrying a “not for resale” branding) and selling it to people on the street for $28. They are being defrauded.

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